Genphil revision

# God and evil

* The existence of extreme human suffering is evidence against an Abrahamic God, but it does not follow that this should lead a religious believer to abandon their faith.
  + The free will defence offers a powerful way for believers to avoid any logical inconsistency between theism and evil
  + additional observations which offer positive evidence for the existence of God mean that a theist need not even conclude from extreme human suffering that their faith is unlikely.
* A version of Mackie’s argument
  + **P1:** There is extreme human suffering.
  + **P2:** Extreme human suffering is bad.
  + **P3:** If God exists, there is no bad.
  + **C:** God does not exist.
* Could reject **P1** or **P2** but awkward
* **P3:** perhaps there would be bad, just not gratuitous evil.
  + Plantinga free will defence
  + it may be the case (a) that some worlds containing free will are better than any without it, (b) that alternate possibilities without changing circumstances are required for free will, and (c) that God could not have actualised a world absent of extreme suffering but containing free will
    - Defence fails if compatibilist free will is logically true, though it’s fine otherwise
  + Maybe that’s unlikely but this is beside the point: there is nothing logically *impossible* in the claim that our world does in fact have the absolute minimum amount of suffering for it to contain free will
* Evidential problem
  + **P4:** There is some extreme human suffering for which we can think of no godly justification.
  + **I:** It is likely that there is some extreme human suffering for which there is no godly justification.
  + **P5:** If God exists, there is not any extreme human suffering for which there is no godly justification.
  + **C’:** It is likely thatGod does not exist.
* If you deny the inference of **I** from **P4** then you’re going down a route of inductive scepticism
  + If the move from “for all φ I have observed, φ is not a justification for extreme suffering” to “for all φ, φ is not a justification for extreme suffering” is unlicensed, then we would never be able to validly generalise from experience (Rowe 1991)
* But other observations about the world may provide positive evidence about God
  + If one wholly believed the ontological argument then no amount of extreme suffering would cause one to doubt the existence of God
  + Or the fine-tuning argument, in which case suffering just lowers your prior